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Some Psycholinguistic Aspects of Metaphor
In this paper I attempt to do three things. First, in view of the
variety of implicit and explicit definitions of metaphor in the
philosophical, psychological and linguistic literature, I shall review the
"standard" definition of metaphor. Second, I will attempt to furnish an
alternative definition of metaphor that seems to accord better with the
facts. Finally, I will discuss various issues related to the processes
involved in the comprehension of metaphors. Along the way I shall make a
few observations about the relationship between metaphors and meaning.
Metaphor: The Standard Definition
The standard dictionary definition is that a metaphor is a word or
phrase applied to an object or concept that it does not literally denote in
order to suggest comparison with another object or concept. Assuming that
it is possible to determine a satisfactory criterion for "literal
denotation," this definition is, no doubt, adequate for the purposes of
lexicographers. But, as we shall see, it is not adequate for the purposes
of psychologists or theoretical linguists. The cognitive psychologist might
be concerned with when and why people use metaphors, and when and how they
understand them. He/she is concerned with the processes presumed to underlie
their use and comprehension, and how, if at all, these processes differ from
and are related to those involved in literal uses of language. The linguist
might be concerned with the formal properties of metaphors and the semantic
and pragmatic relations that they have to their literal counterparts. The
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linguist might also be interested in syntactic relations as they pertain to
certain kinds of figurative language. None of these interests is well
served by the standard dictionary definition.
The standard dictionary definition of metaphor seems to underlie many
of the discussions provided by those working in the various disciplines
concerned with it. For example, to the extent that metaphor has received
serious consideration in linguistics, theoreticians have tended to try to
account for it in terms of selection restriction violations. A good example
of such an approach can be found in Matthews (1971), who makes two claims of
particular interest. One is that the presence of a selection restriction
violation is "a necessary and sufficient condition for the distinguishing of
metaphor from non-metaphor." The second is that the effect of such a
violation is to "de-emphasize the features which figure in [it] as well as
those other features most closely associated with it" (p. 424). Within the
limiting machinery of selection restrictions Matthews makes a reasonable
case for his conclusions. The root of the problem lies in his uncritical
acceptance of a theory of semantic features and all that is implied by it.
The shortcomings of the feature approach to semantics have been discussed at
length both in linguistics and psychology, and Matthews himself admits that
semantic features are not assumed to be either psychologically or physically
real. But even if one were willing to accept feature theory and the
gratuitous ad hoc features that it entails, still there would be two grave
difficulties to overcome. First, one would be unable to account for a whole
class of metaphors in this way. Second, one would in any case be able to
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say little more than that some metaphors are not literally acceptable
because of some particular selection restriction violation. It should be
noted that Matthews does try to deal with these problems.
The class of metaphors that I claim cannot be handled is comprised of
what can be called "whole sentence" metaphors (see, Ortony, Reynolds &
Arter, 1978). Whole sentence metaphors are perfectly well-formed sentences
that involve no selection restriction violations. They are sentences that
demand a metaphorical interpretation in some contexts, and a literal
interpretation in others. Taking an example from Reddy (1969), Matthews
argues that (1) is not a metaphor even though uttered about a decrepit
professor emeritus.
(1) The old rock is becoming brittle with age.
He argues that underlying (1) is a "real" metaphor, (2):
(2) The old professor emeritus is a rock.
But this seems to beg the question. Clearly, if (1) is uttered in the
appropriate context it cannot be interpreted literally in any intelligible
way, so there is no basis for arguing that in such a context (1) is not a
metaphor. It is true that it may imply or presuppose other metaphors such
as (2), but that is not a sufficient reason for denying that (1) is, or at
least can be, a metaphor.
The second problem concerns some of the consequences of the view that
the violation of a selection restriction is a necessary and sufficient
condition for something's being a metaphor. If this is the case there would
seem to be no way to distinguish between a metaphor and a semantic anomaly
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or a falsehood. Matthews' answer to this is to assert that it is merely a
question of speaker intention--the speaker must intend to use language
metaphorically. But, linguistic communication involves not only a speaker
but a hearer. It normally requires that a hearer recognize the speaker's
intentions, and that the speaker speaks on the basis of certain expectations
about such recognition. The problem with locating certain kinds of speech
acts only in the speaker's intentions to perform them is that it renders
those speech acts essentially private rather than public acts. Thus,
suppose that Matthews' account were accepted. Then, from the point of view
of a hearer, who might assume that speakers do not normally intend to speak
falsely, what is to be concluded from an utterance that is false and that
violates a selection restriction? Why should the hearer not conclude that
since the speaker could not have intended to speak falsely he or she must
have intended to speak metaphorically? Yet, surely it does not follow from
the fact that people rarely intend to utter falsehoods that if someone does
inadvertently say something that is false and that also involves a selection
restriction violation, that the hearer ipso facto attributes to him or her
the intention of speaking metaphorically. One who utters (3) is not likely
to be speaking metaphorically:
(3) Sierra Leone is the largest town in Nigeria;
nor, as a rule, is he or she regarded as so speaking. This is not to say
that (3) could not possibly be uttered or understood metaphorically, rather
it is to say that the fact that it is false and involves a selection
restriction violation does not license the inference that someone who uses
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it is speaking metaphorically. Matthews argues that the selection
restriction violation must be from the speaker's point of view, but this
makes metaphor essentially in the mind of the speaker, and without the
introduction of some kind of pragmatic analysis, there it has to stay.
I have concentrated on Matthews' treatment of metaphor not because I
think it is bad--in fact, within the limitations of the theoretical
framework from which he starts I think it is probably as good as one can
get--but because it seems to capture so well the essential ingredients of
the standard dictionary definition approach. For Matthews, like the
dictionary, metaphors operate xclusively at the lexical level, and for
Matthews they involve violations of selection restrictions, which is a more
technical way of saying what the dictionary says, namely that the word or
phrase is applied to an object or concept it does not literally denote.
Generally speaking psychological models of language comprehension have
not concerned themselves with metaphor. Perhaps the most notable exception
is Kintsch (1974) who acknowledges the importance of accounting for the
comprehension of metaphor for any theory to be adequate. While sharing the
general dissatisfaction with a feature theoretic account that has been
mentioned above, Kintsch nevertheless appears to substantially accept
Matthews' account. Rejecting the notion of selection restriction
violations, he replaces it with that of semantic anomaly, and maintains that
semantic anomaly is a necessary condition for metaphor.
I have suggested that not all metaphors are semantically anomalous.
Consider, for example, (4), a perfectly normal English sentence. Certainly,
it is not semantically anomalous.
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(4) Regardless of the danger, the troops marched on.
What determines whether (4) is a metaphor or not is the context in which it
is used. In the context of an army marching to battle it is not likely to
function as a metaphor, but in other contexts, such as (5), it is.
(5) The children continued to annoy their babysitter. She told the
little boys she would not tolerate any more bad behavior.
Climbing all over the furniture was not allowed. She threatened
to not let them watch TV if they continued to stomp, run, and
scream around the room. Regardless of the danger, the troops
marched on.
Here, the entire sentence, (4), is a metaphor. Contrary to the standard
dictionary definition which we have been reviewing, it is not really a case
of a word or phrase being applied to an object it does not literally denote,
because none of the substantive words literally denote their usual objects
or concepts. Not watching TV, or the possibility of it, hardly constitutes
a danger, there are no real troops, and there is no real marching. It is
the whole sentence that is metaphorical, not a word or phrase within it. It
is counterintuitive to insist that (4) is not a metaphor. To do so would be
to base a judgement on an inadequate characterization of what a metaphor is.
One of the most well-known linguistic treatments of metaphor, and one
that avoids some of the problems of the accounts discussed so far, is that
due to Reddy (1969). Although he argues that metaphors occur when the
normal limits of the referentiality of words are contravened, he is anxious
to provide an account that does not exclude sentences such as (4). However,
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things start to go wrong when he tries to characterize the meaning of a
metaphor. He says:
.... the 'meaning' of the utterance is primarily whatever is implied by
the fact that something was expressed in this curious and
unconventional fashion. The symbolic connection of precise referents
is less a bearer of information than the fact that the speaker chose
such and such a word in such and such a context. (p. 249)
Now, whatever the meaning of a metaphorical utterance is, it cannot be what
Reddy says it is. Perhaps the only thing implied by a speaker's "curious
and unconventional" choice of words is that the speaker was unable to
express his intentions in any other way. One would hardly suppose, however,
that the meaning of (4) in a context like (5) was the speaker's inability to
express himself otherwise. On the other hand, it does seem to suppose that
a hearer's recognition of the curious choice of words may sometimes justify,
or even trigger a nonliteral interpretation of them. Furthermore, it
probably is the case that the metaphorical meaning of an utterance such as
(4), is indeed related to certain implications of it, albeit not those that
Reddy has in mind.
I would argue that the metaphorical meaning of a whole-sentence
metaphor like (4) in a context such as (5) has to be related to those
salient components of its literal meaning that do not conflict with the
context, and some of these are implications of the literal meaning. For
example, one of the implications of the literal meaning of (4) is that a
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group of people continued doing what they were already doing without concern
for the consequences. Another is that the probable consequences were
undesirable, another that the people were aware of this, but stubbornly
unconcerned, and so on.
The utilization, in comprehension, of those salient aspects of literal
meaning that do not conflict with the context, is consistent with the
account of the comprehension of part-sentence metaphors such as (6) that I
have proposed in an earlier paper (Ortony, 1975).
(6) The boy dived into the crowd.
All metaphors give rise to what is usually called metaphorical tension which
is a result of the conceptual incompatibility inherent in a metaphor taken
in its context. The comprehension of the metaphor requires the elimination
of the tension, that is, the elimination of aspects of the meaning of words,
phrases or sentences that when interpreted literally give rise to tension.
Metaphor: An Alternative Definition
Having found the standard account wanting, the question arises as to
whether or not a superior, alternative account can be offered. What I
propose to do now is to try to offer such an account. A first requirement
for something to be a metaphor is that it should be pragmatically, or
perhaps better, contextually anomalous. This means that a literal
interpretation of the expression, be it a word, phrase, sentence, or an even
larger unit of text, fails to fit the context. The virtue of this
requirement is that it permits the classification of one and the same
expression as being a metaphor in some cases and not in others. A corollary
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is that it is not linguistic expressions themselves that are metaphors, but
particular uses of them. Thus, whether or not (4) is a metaphor depends
upon the context in which it is used; and, as we have seen, this is as it
should be. The contextual anomaly condition also permits the inclusion of
expressions like (6), since insofar as it expresses something that is
literally impossible, there can be no normal context in which it will fit
unless it is interpreted metaphorically. There may, however, be "abnormal"
or magical contexts that will support a literal interpretation of such
part-sentence metaphors, and to the extent that there are, tokens of such
expressions will not be metaphors. Alice in Wonderland is full of
superficially anomalous sentences that can be interpreted literally because
of the bizarreness of the contexts in which they occur.
The general point that needs to be emphasized here is that if something
is a metaphor then it will be contextually anomalous if interpreted
literally (except in rare cases of ambiguous expressions wherein one reading
makes sense literally and the other metaphorically, in which case the
generalization is still true of the latter reading). Insofar as the
violation of selection restrictions can be interpreted in terms of semantic
incompatibilities at the lexical level, such violations may sometimes be the
basis of the contextual anomaly. But there can be other reasons too, so
that selection restriction violations, or, to use the theoretically more
neutral description, lexical level semantic incompatibilities, are not the
only causes of contextual anomaly. Furthermore, it seems that the
distinction between the literal and the metaphorical is one of degree with
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there being many difficult borderline cases. If (6) is uttered in the
context of a boy running into a crowd of people it seems to be more
metaphorical than if it is uttered in the context of a suicidal leap from a
tall building. In the latter case its status is much more difficult to
determine.
While the contextual anomaly requirement appears to be necessary, it is
not sufficient for the characterization of a metaphor. If taken alone it
suffers from one of the shortcomings of the standard definition just
criticized. It is important to exclude from the class of metaphors,
genuine, unresolvable contextual anomalies. Such expressions are
unresolvable in the sense that no amount of processing can eliminate the
conceptual incompatibilities that exist, be they inter- or intra-sentence
ones. Consequently, that part of the comprehension process concerned with
the tension elimination fails. So the apparent literal anomaly inherent in
metaphorically interpretable expressions, is unresolvable in genuinely
anomalous ones. Again, it has to be noted that whether some particular
expression is genuinely anomalous depends on the context in which it occurs.
We now have two conditions for something's being a metaphor, which, if
taken conjointly seem to be necessary and sufficient. The first is the
contextual anomaly condition, the second is that the metaphorical tension
should in principle be eliminable. We should probably introduce a third
condition, or at least, a caveat, that makes reference to the speaker's
intentions and his or her expectations about their recognition. For
example, one might require that the speaker intend to speak metaphorically,
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and that in order to do so he or she must believe that the tension
elimination condition holds, and probably also that the contextual anomaly
condition holds. Presumably, the speaker must further believe, or at least
expect, that the hearer will recognize these beliefs. If a speaker does not
hold such beliefs, whereas he might produce a metaphor inadvertently, in the
sense that a hearer might recognize that the two conditions hold,
nevertheless, the hearer will wrongly attribute to the speaker certain
communicative intentions that were never there, and communication may break
down as a consequence. The role of intentions in language production in
general is a very complex issue and one whose detailed treatment lies well
beyond the scope of the present paper. However it may well be that one has
to settle for a rather weak conception of intention. An operational account
of such a weak notion of intention might merely require that a speaker be
willing to agree that he or she had such an intention after the fact, rather
than postulating a specific intention as a causal component of the behavior
(which would be a much stronger notion.) The intentions that speakers have
as causal components of what they say are likely to be much more global
than, for example, the intention to use a particular expression
metaphorically. The issue of intention becomes even more complicated when
it is considered in connection with the production of metaphors by very
young children (see, Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer & Wolf, 1978, for a
discussion of this). If intention is an important component in metaphor
production, as it obviously is in the use of language in general, then the
attribution to very young children of the capacity to produce metaphors
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would suggest that children have rather more sophisticated meta-linguistic
skills than has generally been supposed. This would be particularly true if
one relied on a strong notion of intention. Frequently-cited evidence that
young children can perceive resemblances and make comparisons does not
justify the conclusion that they have the ability to intentionally use
language nonliterally. Comparisons themselves can be literal or nonliteral;
their status in this regard depends on what the speaker knows about the
referents of the terms being compared, so that it is not always possible for
a hearer to judge whether a comparison was or was not intended as a literal
one anyway (see, Ortony, 1978; Ortony, in press).
I want now to enlarge somewhat on the theoretical basis of my revised
definition of a metaphor, namely, that a metaphor is the use of an
expression that is contextually anomalous and for which the metaphoric
tension is in principle eliminable. Consider first the contextual anomaly
requirement. In his classic paper on Logic and Conversation, Grice (1975)
proposes that human linguistic communication is governed by what he calls
the Cooperative Principle; a principle that reflects the fact that
conversations normally take place against a background of speaker and hearer
expectations to cooperate in communication. The Cooperative Principle
comprises a number of maxims: "Make your contribution as informative as
required," "Try to make your contribution one that is true," "Be relevant"
and "Be perspicuous." In order to achieve adequate generalizability it
appears necessary to modify and extend some of Grice's original
formulations. Following the terminology of Gordon and Lakoff (1975) I shall
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refer to my modifications and extensions of Grice's maxims as Conversational
Postulates, and for the purposes of illustration I will elaborate on two of
them.
Gordon and Lakoff propose that there exist what they call sincerity
conditions underlying utterances. Meanwhile, as we have seen, Grice has as
one of his maxims an injunction to speak the truth. Combining these gives
us the sincerity postulate. The problem with Grice's maxim is that it is
too specific since it applies only to assertions whereas what is needed are
conversational postulates that govern all speech act types rather than
specific types. Grice's maxim could thus be regarded as an instantiation of
the sincerity postulate. Expressed in words, the sincerity postulate would
be something like, "Try to mean (literally) what you say and imply." This
governs not only the truth of assertions, but the felicity of promises, the
genuineness of orders, and so on. The second postulate of concern to us is
the relevance postulate which is the same as Grice's maxim "Be relevant."
Conversations would not be conversations were there to be no relevance
connections between adjacent parts; in the same way, it is presumably the
case that such relevance relations also distinguish a text from a random
collection of sentences.
One of the chief points that emerges from Grice's paper is that while
conversational postulates frequently appear to be violated, these violations
are usually only apparent, and they occur often for very good reasons.
Another way of making this point is to observe that speakers very rarely opt
out of the Cooperative Principle. This means that when a hearer encounters
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an apparent violation of a conversational postulate, rather than assuming
the violation to be real, he attempts to make sense of what has been said in
such a way as to render the violation only apparent. The studies reported in
Clark and Lucy (1975) could be regarded as being concerned with these
resolution processes as they occur in indirect requests. In the case of
metaphors it seems that the contextual anomaly characteristic also arises
from the apparent violation of one or more of the conversational postulates;
the question is, which? Obviously not all apparent violations give rise to
metaphorical interpretations. Most indirect speech acts are not metaphors.
So, if the existence of contextual anomaly is a necessary condition for a
metaphor, and if all apparent violations of conversational postulates give
rise to contextual anomaly, then either we have to restrict the metaphor-
generating sources of contextual anomaly to some specific subset of apparent
violations, or, the burden of distinguishing metaphors from other cases of
superficially anomalous uses will fall on the resolvability-of-metaphoric-
tension condition.
It is by no means clear that a suitable subset of apparent violations
can be found, although it might be worth exploring the possibility that
metaphors arise as the result of the apparent violation of both the
sincerity postulate and the relevance postulate together. Recall the
sentence about the troops, (4), in the context of the frustrated baby-
sitter, (5). Since reference is made to non-existent troops, non-existent
marching, and non-existent danger, there is an apparent violation of the
sincerity postulate. Furthermore, the sudden introduction of these things,
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if taken literally, is clearly irrelevant, so there is an apparent violation
of the relevance postulate too l
If such an account were to be translated into a processing model, the
comprehension of metaphors would be characterized by there first being a
recognition of the violation of the two postulates followed by a process
that rendered those violations only apparent, and that process, as I have
already suggested, would be the process of tension elimination, to be
discussed in a moment. However, I rather doubt that this model will cover
even the majority of cases. For, even though whole sentence metaphors
constitute particularly good candidates for it, it is probably the case that
all kinds of non-metaphors violate the two postulates that I have suggested
might be unique to metaphors. Second, it is not at all clear that such an
analysis is appropriate for part sentence metaphors. Furthermore, there are
good reasons for supposing that hearers often understand metaphors without
any awareness of contextual anomaly at all. I shall have more to say on
this later.
Tension elimination can be conveniently discussed in terms of three
functions that metaphor can perform. These functions, which are more fully
discussed in Ortony (1975) can be expressed as three theses which I shall
briefly sketch now. The first is the inexpressibility thesis which claims
that metaphors are a means of expressing things that are literally
inexpressible in the language in question. It is probably the case that
many "dead" metaphors derive their origin from this fact, thereby becoming,
for practical purposes, literal expressions today of what was literally
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inexpressible yesterday. Consider the vocabulary available in English to
describe sounds. It is rather impoverished. If, in trying to describe a
loud roar, one says that it was a loud roar, the range of possible noises
consistent with that description may well be too great to fulfill the
communicative intent. It could cover anything from the sound of a lion to
that of a football crowd or airplane. However, the judicious use of
metaphor or simile can serve to severely restrict that scope, as when, for
example, one would say that it sounded like a railway train going through
the room. Assuming that a train was not actually going through the room
such a figurative use of language would permit a descriptive "fine tuning"
that is unavailable if the language is used only literally. The second
thesis, the compactness thesis, while closely related to the
inexpressibility thesis, makes a rather different point. It is not so much
concerned with the fact that some metaphors have no literal equivalents as
it is with the fact that in cases where there are literal equivalents such
expressions are very prolix by comparison. If a woman describes her husband
as a teddy bear, her intention may be to predicate far more of him than can
be readily achieved using single discrete literal predicates. She may want
to convey a host of things about him: that he is warm, cuddly, loveable,
harmless, soft, etc. etc. The compactness thesis could be regarded as
capturing the "etc." aspect, and all that it entails. Finally, the third
thesis is the vividness thesis. In essence, it suggests that there are
phenomenological and psychological reasons for supposing that metaphors are
more image-evoking and more vivid than even their best literal equivalents
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(if there are any).
The three aspects of metaphor represented by the inexpressibility
thesis, the compactness thesis, and the vividness thesis all relate to the
process of tension elimination. When the woman describes her husband as a
teddy bear the tension arises as a result of the incompatibility of the
humanness of her husband and the non-humanness of teddy bears. Tension
elimination is achieved by ignoring those salient aspects or attributes of
teddy bears that are perceived as being incompatible with husbands. In this
particular example the attributes are such things as "being a toy." In the
general case the attributes can be much more complex and may not even be
easily representable in the language. Certainly they are not restricted in
the way that semantic features are (see Ortony, 1978). What I am proposing
is that when these attributes have been eliminated the remaining salient
attributes of the vehicle are attributed as a whole, that is, an entire
cognitive substructure is mapped onto the topic. By predicating the non-
conflicting attributes en masse the articulation of discrete predicates is
not required, nor even is a conscious recognition of them. This clearly
achieves compactness. It might also achieve vividness and greater
imageability since holistic representations of this kind might be closer to
perceptual representations than a set of abstracted predicates articulated
through the medium of language. The matter is, however, rather more
complicated since the tension elimination process might be different under
different circumstances2 .
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It is often said that metaphors are (intended to suggest) comparisons.
The account offered here suggests that the role of comparison is in the
tension elimination process. Undoubtedly some metaphors are intended by
their authors to focus on shared characteristics between the topic and the
vehicle, but others may be intended as a way of expressing what is literally
inexpressible, or as a way of causing the hearer to see things in new ways.
Sometimes, therefore, comparison may be better regarded as the means of
comprehension rather than the purpose of it.
Metaphor: Some Issues Concerning Comprehension
The psychological implications of a Cricean approach to metaphor seem
clear enough. In his/her effort after meaning, a hearer may recognize that
something is contextually anomalous and that it cannot be sensibly literally
interpreted in the context. The hearer then must try to construct an
interpretation that resolves the apparent violations of the (sincerity and
relevance) postulates. This suggests that more, and presumably deeper,
processing is required which in turn should demand more mental effort and
more processing time. But, I have suggested that there may not be very many
occasions upon which such a stage model adequately describes the
comprehension process. This is to say that whereas a Gricean account might
be helpful in characterizing what a metaphor is, it does not necessarily
help much in characterizing how a metaphor is understood. However, by
providing a means for offering a more realistic notion of what a metaphor
is, it may provide new prospects for investigating the comprehension of
metaphors in the laboratory, an enterprise that in the past has been
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thwarted by the difficulty of producing interesting comparisons and adequate
controls (see, Ortony, Reynolds & Arter, 1978).
For example, an experiment reported in Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, and
Antos (1978) was designed to investigate the question of whether or not
metaphors (always) take longer to understand than comparable literal uses of
language, as seems to be predicted by the Gricean account. Accordingly, we
tried to determine whether sentences that followed a context which induced
their literal interpretations would be comprehended more rapidly than those
same sentences following contexts that induced metaphorical interpretations.
We also wanted to determine whether the amount of context was a factor. We
therefore collected reaction times to understanding sentences while varying
the type and length of preceding context. In a second experiment we used a
similar procedure to look at performance on idioms. It was hypothesized
that with familiar idioms comprehension would be as quick as, if not quicker
than, comprehension of those same expressions interpreted literally.
Results of the first experiment showed a strong main effect for length
of context; targets following long contexts took much less time to
understand than did targets following short contexts. Thus, for example, a
sentence like (7) as it appears in a context like (8) took significantly
less time to understand than if the context segment were shortened to
include only the first sentence of (8).
(7) The fabric had begun to fray
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(8) Lucy and Phil needed a marriage councelor. They had once been
very happy but after several years of marriage they had become
discontented with one another. Little habits which had at first
been endearing were now irritating and caused many senseless and
heated arguments. The fabric had begun to fray.
There was also a strong main effect for type of context wherein targets
following contexts inducing a metaphorical interpretation (like (7) in the
context of (8)) took significantly longer to understand than did targets
following literal inducing contexts (like (7) in the context of (9)).
(9) The old couch needed reupholstering. After two generations of
wear, the edges of the couch were tattered and soiled. Several
buttons were missing and the material around the seems was
beginning to unravel. The upholstery had become very shabby.
The fabric had begun to fray.
Finally, and perhaps most interesting, was the significant interaction
between context type and context length. The difference between literals
and metaphors was greater for short contexts (4419 and 3616 msec,
respectively) than for long ones (2141 and 1910 msec, respectively).
While these results are not capable of distinguishing decisively
between alternative theoretical accounts of the underlying processes, it is
worth noting that they do not seem to be consistent with a Gricean, stage,
model. They suggest that if enough context is provided to enable the
construction of a rich semantic representation of the context, then a
certain amount of predictive power is provided; an interpretive framework
Aspects of Metaphor
21
for the target is established. This would mean that while in the short
context condition, the metaphor is processed primarily in a bottom up
fashion, in the long context condition top-down processes play a larger
role. The metaphor still needs to be "reinterpreted," but the new
interpretation is already suggested by the context in the long context
condition.
The data from the second experiment showed that idioms used
idiomatically take significantly less time to comprehend than do those same
expressions used literally. For example, a phrase like "let her hair down"
is understood quicker if it occurs in a context that induces its idiomatic
reading than if it occurs in one that induces its literal meaning. The mean
reaction times for such decisions were 1383 and 1677 msec, respectively.
Idioms also take less time than literal translations of their idiomatic
meanings (1486 msec), although not significantly less.
Our results then, particularly from the first experiment, suggest that
two important variables affecting the comprehension of nonliteral uses of
language in general, and of metaphors in particular, are the nature of and
the amount of contextual support. With abundant support, whole sentence
metaphors appear to be (often) interpreted, as it were, directly and
immediately. With little support, a Gricean stage model seems to fit the
data. But, as was noted earlier, such a model does not seem appropriate for
part sentence metaphors like (6). In such cases, it seems that a better
approach is to think in terms of the partial application of the meaning of
that part of the sentence being used metaphorically. Furthermore, since
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literal uses of language themselves usually capitalize on only parts of the
meanings of the components, as dictated by the context, that would suggest
that the process for the comprehension of nonliteral uses might, in many, if
not in most cases, be fundamentally the same as that for the comprehension
of literal uses. This possibility seems to be a very attractive one when
worked out in greater detail (see, e.g., Rumelhart, in press; Ortony, 1978.)
The psychological study of metaphor is still very much in its infancy.
It is not an easy area to investigate. Even if we get satisfactory answers
to all the questions currently being addressed, there are many and difficult
ones remaining. I shall conclude by making a few observations on just one
of them, namely, the relationship between metaphors and similes.
No adequate theory of metaphor can ignore the difference between
metaphor and simile. When the woman says of her husband that he is a teddy
bear, she uses a metaphor; when she says of him that he is like a teddy
bear, she uses a simile. Traditionally the distinction between metaphor and
simile has been made in terms of the distinction between an implicit
comparison (metaphor) and an explicit comparison (simile), the latter
typically being marked by the presence of "like" or "as." In terms of the
analysis that I have offered, it might seem that there is an important
difference between metaphors and similes because the apparent violation, at
least of the sincerity postulate, is immediately obvious in the case of the
metaphor, but much less obvious for the simile. Thus, it is presumably
false that the woman's husband is a teddy bear, but is it so obvious that he
is not like one? Unless one takes "like" to mean "like in all respects" it
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would seem that there are respects in which he is like a teddy bear so that
(10) and (11) would appear to have the same truth value.
(10) My husband is like a teddy bear.
(11) My husband is like a teddy bear in some respects.
(12) My husband is a teddy bear.
Since, in some respects, almost everything is like almost everything else,
it would seem to follow that under normal circumstances of use, (10) and
(11) are true, and if they are both true, they are both literal uses of
language, and one might then ask why it is that similes should be discussed
in the same context as metaphors at all since the corresponding metaphor,
(12), is presumably false. This possibility, that similes are in fact
literal uses of language, rather naturally leads to the kind of analysis
Kintsch offers. One could argue that since a hearer knows that the
metaphorical statement, (12), is literally false he attempts to construct a
simile such as (10) from it. The answer, I think, is the one that I discuss
in Ortony (1978; Ortony, in press), namely that for genuine similes
3
considered literally, there are no shared salient properties . If this is
the case, one might then go on to argue that in fact (10) is false, and that
(11) is only trivially true; that is, the respects in which the two terms
are similar are trivial, irrelevant respects. This would be one reasonable
way to try to reinstate the relevance of similes to metaphors. There are
others.
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Conclusion
In this paper I have taken the position that there is a real difference
between literal and nonliteral uses of language. In terms of a general
theory of meaning, this difference has been construed as partly involving a
difference in (a weak notion of) speaker intentions. In the case of literal
uses of language, speakers mean what they say and say what they mean. In
the case of nonliteral language uses, they do not mean what they say, and, I
have argued, it may be impossible for them to say what they mean within the
constraints of a particular language. Implicit in my remarks has been the
notion that in the general case the meaning of an utterance is related to
its implications, or some of them. In the case of nonliteral uses of
language, many of these are inappropriate and have to be discarded. It may
well be that in terms of a theory of meaning, the distinction between
literal and nonliteral uses of language is based on a difference of degree
rather than anything else. That is, it may well be that some utterances are
more metaphorical than others. Such a conclusion seems quite innocuous and
is certainly compatible with the notion that the extreme cases might involve
different kinds of cognitive processes.
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INotice that we are better able to appeal to a violation of our more
general sincerity postulate than we are to Grice's truth maxim, for since
there are as yet no established referents for any of the substantive terms
in (4), the truth value of (4) is presumably undetermined. Notice also how
the question of truth is assessed relative to the context, as must be the
question of sincerity in general.
2
For example, suppose one distinguishes between metaphors which are
based on known similarities and metaphors which require the discovery of new
similarities. In the case of a metaphor based on known similarities no new
knowledge will be acquired as a result of its comprehension. In such cases
it may well be that comprehension is achieved not by attribute rejection but
by attribute selection.
Actually, this claim is rather oversimplified. There may be shared
properties in similes, but where there are, these properties have subtle but
important differences in the different domains of the two terms.
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